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When introduced as a method to control soil erosion, kudzu' was hailed
as an asset to agriculture, but it has become a creeping monster. Arbitra-
tion was innocuous when limited to negotiated commercial contracts, but
it developed sinister characteristics when it became ubiquitous.2
Just before making the arbitration to kudzu analogy, the court said: "When
two equally sophisticated parties bargain at arms length to submit disputes to arbi-
tration, that agreement should be enforceable. Troubling questions arise when one
party lacks the sophistication and bargaining power of the other. .. .", Courts
often use the terms "sophistication" and "bargaining power" as complements, but
in today's business world, a party can be very sophisticated and still be taken ad-
vantage of in negotiating contracts with arbitration clauses because it has little or
no bargaining power.
Associate Professor, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. B.A., M.A., J.D., Emory University.
Thank you to my research assistant, Timothy Murray.
1. A vine brought to the U.S. from Japan to control erosion that has overtaken trees, land, and grass
in much of the South, including cropland, and which is nearly impossible to remove. 16 ENCYCL.
AMERICANA 594 (Scholastic Library Publishing, Inc. 2005). For pictures of kudzu creating monsters
out of trees, see Jack and June Anthony, Kudzu - the Vine, http://www.jjanthony.com/kudzu/ (last
visited Sept. 6, 2010).
2. Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999)
(finding an arbitration clause unconscionable in part because it required the complainant to pay an
initial filing fee and at least part of the arbitrator's fees, and lamenting the Supreme Court's decision in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (expanding arbitration to consumer
disputes)).
3. Knepp, 229 B.R. at 828.
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Traditionally, courts and arbitration providers have provided more protection
for individuals who enter into contracts that include clauses requiring arbitration
and then realize they do not want to arbitrate than for commercial entities in the
same predicament.4 A number of recent court decisions regarding contracts, and
specifically regarding arbitration, have modified this analysis to distinguish be-
tween what the courts refer to as sophisticated and unsophisticated entities rather
than corporations and individuals in their analysis of enforceability. Usually the
distinction is made to justify a court's enforcement of an arbitration clause against
a business or an individual-because the party objecting to arbitration is "sophis-
ticated," the objection is easily dismissed.
In arbitration clause analysis, the argument is that sophisticated business-
people, individually or on behalf of a commercial entity, can protect themselves
from an onerous arbitration clause, while an unsophisticated person cannot. Often
courts mix this sophisticated party distinction with a traditional unconscionability
analysis of the difference in negotiating power without recognizing that they are
not the same concepts. Courts avoid addressing the obviously negative effect
their decisions have on parties who may be sophisticated entities entering com-
mercial contracts but who have no real bargaining power or on unsophisticated (or
significantly less sophisticated) small businesses or sole proprietors entering into
contracts of adhesion.
Generally, where the court determines that the contracting party is "sophisti-
cated," the court upholds the arbitration clause. Because the courts have not ex-
plicitly set out a distinction that allows for any bright line rules or guiding prin-
ciples, the approach allows powerful parties to reach results through arbitration
that harm both the less powerful party that signed the contract and non-parties to
the contract, especially consumers, affected by the decision. The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) was passed to allow parties negotiating at arms' length and with
roughly equal negotiating power to contractually agree to resolve disputes quick-
ly, efficiently, and with an expert decision maker. Congress did not intend to
allow parties to contract away statutory protections so that powerful corporations
can shield themselves from liability.
The Supreme Court heard or addressed a significant number of arbitration
cases in the 2010 term.5 The decisions made it clear that the Supreme Court
wanted to emphasize self-determination by the parties, enforcing contracts as
parties wrote them. Arguably the Court left open the possibility of providing
protection for consumers forced into arbitration against their will.6 In her dissent
in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Inc.,, discussed in detail in Section IV,
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Justice Alito, in his majority opinion, empha-
4. Meredith Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REv.
493, 506 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Rent-A-Center,
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related
Servs., Co.; In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (mem.) (2010); Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (mem.) (2010).
The Supreme Court also decided Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010),
but that case deals with a collective bargaining agreement and does not appear to consider sophistica-
tion as a factor.
6. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., Stevens, J., Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sized the sophisticated nature of the bargaining parties, thus leaving room to make
a distinction to protect consumers who enter into contracts that do not necessarily
protect all of their rights.7 Yet the effect of even the decisions post-Stolt-Nielsen
to date is to allow powerful corporations to force both corporations and individu-
als to accept contracts with arbitration clauses that protect the powerful corpora-
tion in ways not anticipated by Congress when it passed the FAA.
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,8 decided shortly after
Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court ignored an opportunity to define the distinction
between consumers and more sophisticated parties that it alluded to in Stolt-
Nielsen. Instead it reversed without opinion a Second Circuit decision that had
refused to enforce a class action waiver in agreements between small merchants
and American Express on public policy grounds because the waiver left these
sophisticated parties with no ability to protect rights Congress created if forced
into arbitration without a class action option.9
In both cases, important rights remained unguarded in arbitration because the
Court held that our system provides no feasible way to pursue them. Because the
Supreme Court has made it clear that its analysis emphasizes the parties' contract
language and because these contracts are almost always drafted by the more po-
werful party, Congress must step in to protect society from weaker parties signing
away the protections Congress built into our laws.
It makes little sense to protect the rights of consumers to bring class actions
or to gain court review of unfair arbitration decisions and not to protect the rights
of merchants caught in the same web by more powerful merchants. The mer-
chants in Italian Colors will pass along to consumers the higher fees they wanted
to protest, just like the costs the shippers allegedly overpaid in Stolt-Nielsen. The
main difference is that in the cases that do not allow class actions in the commer-
cial context, the costs of unprotected rights get spread throughout the consumer
economy rather than directed at one specific consumer or employee, as in the
individual cases.
Courts should recognize the effect their decisions have on both the obvious
parties and those who are unnamed but not unaffected. They should take into
account the fact that Congress set out protected rights not just for individuals, but
to protect society-from anti-trust violators, from unethical fees, from companies
trying to hide their wrongdoings from the public, and from companies trying to
avoid creating precedent-the underlying basis for our legal system. Congress
must help by clarifying the FAA and by returning to parties the protections pro-
vided by our judicial system but not necessarily available in arbitration. Courts
should not hold that parties can contract away these protections. They do not
belong just to the individual; they belong to society.
Searching for distinctions based on sophistication, commercial nature, or al-
leged arms-length negotiations does not provide protection. Instead, courts inter-
7. Id.
8. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. CT. 2401 (mem.) (2010).
9. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d at 320, rev'd, Am. Express Co., 130 S. Ct. 2401
(specifically pointing out that its decision is based on the need to protect statutory rights and the fact
that the potential recovery is too small to be brought without a class action, not that the clause is un-
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ested in creating guidance for parties drafting, negotiating, signing, and enforcing
arbitration clauses must consider that their guidance applies to all types of dis-
putes and all types of parties. If courts or Congress want to return to arbitration as
it was intended-a viable alternative to litigation because it offers a quicker, less
expensive, final decision by a decision maker with expertise in the subject mat-
ter-the courts and Congress need to provide rules and specific guidance. That
way parties can return to resolving disputes rather than fighting about how to re-
solve them.
Part II of this Article will provide a survey of the FAA, the cases that have
enforced it since its passage in 1925, and the distinctions made by the drafters and
the courts. Part III addresses a number of the common themes and limitations
raised by cases applying the FAA, including the ability to protect statutory rights,
the right to contract and have courts enforce contractual obligations, the need to
protect consumers subject to mandatory arbitration clauses, and the need for fi-
nality in arbitration. Part IV reviews recent legislative and Supreme Court deci-
sions considering issues regarding sophisticated and unsophisticated parties in
arbitration. Part V offers approaches to arbitration suggested by these recent deci-
sions and the need to ensure that arbitration remains a viable alternative to litiga-
tion but not a tool for avoiding liability or precedent.
II. HISTORY OF THE FAA AND CONGRESS'S SOPHISTICATED/COMMERCIAL
PARTIES EMPHASIS
Arbitration has been around longer than any modern system of justice. It ap-
pears in Greek and Roman law.'0 Modern arbitration finds its basis in medieval
England and France, starting arguably as a form of mediation with friends or close
colleagues trying to bring peace to a dispute, and slowly evolving into a process
where the friends recommended an outcome and worked with the parties to accept
the proposed solution." Unlike courts, friends and colleagues can bring their
particular background, and often their expertise, to the problem, find an equitable
solution, and send the disputing parties back to work in short order, with a worka-
ble solution, gained at little expense. Unfortunately, this practice was met with
hostility in England as a court system developed, allegedly because the judges
were paid according to how many disputes they heard.12 The publicly stated and
arguably more sound reason for the hostility was that arbitration created an ouster
of jurisdiction for the courts. 3 In other words, judges knew that arbitration did
not protect parties from bad arbitration decisions, especially given the lack of
appeal, and the court system provided protections, so they encouraged parties to
remain in the judicial system.14
10. DOUGLAS H. YARN & GREGORY TODD JONES, ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 9:4 (3d ed., Thomson 2006).
11. See Douglas H. Yam, The Death Of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through Institu-
tionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 929, 943-44 (2004).
12. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1942)
("Lord Campbell explained the English attitude as due to the desire of the judges, at a time when their
salaries came largely from fees, to avoid loss of income.").
13. Id at 983.
14. Id. at 984.
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A. Congress Adopted Arbitration With Support From Businesses
American courts adopted this anti-arbitration policy, and, until the late 1800s,
refused to enforce arbitration clauses if one party challenged them.' 5 As the Unit-
ed States became more industrialized, though, companies searched for an alterna-
tive to the court system for resolving their increasing numbers of disputes. 16 In
1920, New York passed a statute allowing enforcement of arbitration clauses."
This change of approach smoothed the way for the FAA,18 passed by Congress in
1925, and then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States
Code. Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts.' 9
At the time it passed, it was generally understood that the FAA was intended
to govern equally sophisticated business entities bargaining at arms' length.20
In 1925, the economy looked substantially different than it looks today.
There were very few transactions between large merchants and individual
consumers that would have involved interstate commerce and thus fallen
under the jurisdiction of the FAA. In fact, when one Senator raised a
concern that arbitration contracts might be "offered on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis to captive customers or employees," the bill's supporters reas-
sured the Senator that they did not intend to cover such situations.21
When this concern was raised again in the hearings held shortly before Con-
gress passed the FAA, the responding speaker, who had drafted the first draft of
the proposed legislation, responded that Congress had passed other statutes to
protect against the "take-it-or-leave-it" arbitration clause. The example he gave
was of shippers being protected by the "Bill of Lading" Act and other federal
statutes.22 He pointed out that the real historical reason for not enforcing arbitra-
tion clauses was the legitimate concern that, "at the time this rule was made
people were not able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the
stronger men would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in
15. Id.
16. John C. Norling, The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption Power: An Examination
ofImport ofSaturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 139, 140 (1991).
17. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law. § 7501 (1920).
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1925). The FAA governs agreements to arbitrate "in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy the-
reafter arising out of such contract or transaction." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
19. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
20. Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 647 (1996) (citing Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FAA was primarily in-
tended to cover merchants engaged in interstate commerce).
21. Id. (internal citations omitted).
22. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the Subcommittees ofthe Committeez on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., I st Sess., 15 (1924).
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and protect them."23 Because Congress had since provided protections, he argued,
this was no longer a concern. Unfortunately, his dismissal of that potential prob-
lem for the future proved shortsighted. With the passage of the FAA supported
overwhelmingly by the American Bar Association, various chambers of com-
merce, and business interests,24 Congress passed it and it went into effect in 1925.
1. Arbitration Has Many Advantages
American businesses supported the FAA because they recognized that arbitra-
tion has many advantages. For example, used as Congress intended, arbitration
can be quicker and less expensive than litigation. It allows parties to agree on
when, where, and how the issues will be heard. Parties choose their decision
maker(s), which can be extremely important in complex transactions where the
decision maker needs specialized knowledge to understand and decide the dis-
pute.25 And arbitration, at least prior to attempts to expand review, offers finali-
ty-the parties accept the decision of the arbitrator(s), comply with the require-
ments, and get back to business. Of course, in 1925, arbitration proceeded within
three or four days of requesting it,26 not the years it often takes in modem arbitra-
tion, and, at least in New York, arbitrators in 1925 often "work[ed] for nothing,
for the mere honor of the position . .. [or for] a small charge, if the matter is com-
plicated and takes too much time."27 Not so now, when just the cost of paying
arbitration fees can make it prohibitive.
2. Arbitration Has Disadvantages, Too
Even in 1925, however, courts and businesses recognized a number of draw-
backs to arbitration, but believed that merchants could understand and weigh the
advantages and disadvantages to reach an informed choice.28 Some of the disad-
vantages of arbitration are as obvious as giving up a right to a jury trial and judi-
cial consideration of the law as it applies to the facts and that it is held in a non-
public forum, with limited review, and does not create precedent. Some of the
less obvious disadvantages include limited discovery as a trade-off for quicker
resolution, sometimes limited remedies,29 the cost of paying the arbitrator(s), and
often an administrative fee. A party also faces the possibility that the party draft-
ing the arbitration clause will require arbitration in order to avoid publicity, will
23. Id. (pointing out that the U.S. was now in a stronger trade position with countries like England,
and that Congress had passed protective litigation).
24. Id. at 19-24.
25. For example, it makes little sense to ask a jury to decide whether one company's technology
infringes another's patent when the jury cannot even understand the technology, let alone the nuances
of patent rights. For construction disputes, a jury or even a judge can hardly be expected to determine
which of the contractors caused the structural problems with a building or place blame for delays
where each contractor's work builds from the last, even with experts trying to explain the intricate
facts and relationships.
26. H.R. 646, supra note 23, at 17.
27. Id. at 27.
28. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
29. See discussion of limiting remedies, infra notes 70-75.
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choose an arbitrator likely to rule in its favor (due to history and likelihood of re-
hire by repeat players), or try to avoid litigation's protections for the weaker party,
such as class actions. These latter disadvantages have become much clearer in the
past thirty years, as the courts have become much more lenient in enforcing arbi-
tration clauses.3 o
B. The Supreme Court Went Cautiously Into the Arbitration Age
As the Supreme Court recognized in Wilko v. Swan,31 arbitration offers
"prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies," but at the cost of
"less certainty of legally correct adjustment." 32 Likely based on the concern that
this trade off might harm individuals more than commercial entities, the Supreme
Court initially did not simply enforce all arbitration clauses signed prior to a dis-
pute arising (pre-dispute arbitration clauses). In Wilko, the Supreme Court did not
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration clause against a securities buyer trying to enforce
his rights under the Securities Act.33 The Court distinguished between commercial
entities and individuals, and reasoned that the judicial forum provided by the Act
was an important protection for individuals that could not be waived prior to the
dispute.3 4 "Recognizing the advantages that prior agreements for arbitration may
provide for the solution of commercial controversies, we decide that the intention
of Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding
invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act."35
The Supreme Court followed this cautious application of the FAA in Bern-
hardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 36 where the Court refused to enforce an arbitra-
tion clause in an employment agreement because the employment did not involve
interstate commerce. The Court said "[t]here is no showing that petitioner while
performing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in' commerce,
was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected
commerce, within the meaning of our decisions."3 7
Similarly, in several early labor arbitration cases, including Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court refused to require individuals to arbitrate
statutory claims, distinguishing between labor arbitration on the one hand, which
handled issues germane to the collective bargaining agreement, a "majoritarian"
agreement based on the union's agreement not to strike, and individual claims
under Title VII on the other, which are designed to protect individual statutory
rights. The Supreme Court held that, "[w]hile courts should defer to an arbitral
30. See section II.C. below.
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (1953) (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 438.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 435, 438.
35. Id. at 438.
36. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956). The case was distinguished and all
but overruled by Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (explaining the
expansion of the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause to "exercise Congress' commerce
power to the full").
37. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01.
38. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (allowing union member to take race
discrimination to court); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (allowing
241No. 2]
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decision where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, different considerations apply where the employee's
claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers."39 The Court reasoned that "a stan-
dard that adequately ensured effectuation of Title VII rights in the arbitral forum
would tend to make arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and time-
consuming process. And judicial enforcement of such a standard would almost
require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees' claims.",40 The
Court's fears were both well-stated and well-founded. Those fears came to pass
once the Supreme Court changed its mind and started enforcing arbitration clauses
forced on consumers, employees, and others, resulting in great difficulty for those
trying to protect their rights.
In Wilko, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, and Bernhardt, the Supreme Court
addressed individual claims and recognized that arbitration was not the appropri-
ate forum to pursue these claims.
C. The Federal Arbitration Act's Expansive Application
As the Supreme Court started interpreting the Commerce Clause broadly,41
the Court also opened the door to broad interpretation of the FAA and broad en-
forcement of arbitration clauses. This expansion started in the late 1960s, and
expanded most rapidly in the 1980s and '90s. From Prima Paint forward, the
Court declared a federal policy favoring arbitration over litigation.42 In Moses H.
Cone Mem '1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,43 the Supreme Court stated "Courts
of Appeals have since Prima Paint . .. consistently concluded that questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration. We agree."" The Court held that ambiguous arbitration clauses
should be construed in favor of arbitrating disputes.45
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,46 the Supreme Court significantly expanded
the reach of the FAA. In Keating, the Court held that the FAA "withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting party agreed to resolve by arbitration." In other words, states
could no longer pass laws to exempt certain types of claims from arbitration, pro-
vide for additional review, or otherwise limit enforcement of arbitration clauses if
the agreement was covered by the FAA. The states' inability to pass laws specifi-
employees to bring minimum wage claim under FLSA even though they had unsuccessfully submitted
wage claim based on same underlying facts to joint labor/management grievance committee). For a
more thorough discussion of the labor cases and the policies the Court applied, see Sternlight, supra
note 21, at 653-54.
39. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737.
40. Alexander, 414 U.S. at 58-59.
41. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
42. See Stemlight, supra note 21, at 647 n.10 (providing a list of Supreme Court cases in the 1980s
and '90s enforcing arbitration clauses based on the "Congressional preference").
43. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 24-25.
46. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
47. Id. at 10.
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cally limiting the enforceability of arbitration clauses eased concerns about incon-
sistent decisions for businesses and individuals. In subsequent decisions, the
Court also held that state laws that required parties drafting arbitration clauses to
place them on the front page or otherwise make them apparent are not enforcea-
ble.48 And of course, there are numerous Supreme Court cases limiting the ability
of courts to review arbitration decisions.49
1. Courts Enforced Arbitration Clauses Because Congress Did Not Exempt
Statutory Rights Claims From Arbitration
From Southland in the early 1980s and for the next decade or more, courts
became very "hands off" in enforcing arbitration agreements, especially between
merchants. As long as the agreement allowed the parties to pursue their statutorily
protected rights or to enforce the contract the parties signed, arbitration clauses
were enforced. The Supreme Court used two theories for this expansion. First
was the preference for arbitration over litigation, discussed above. For example,
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,50 the Supreme Court
upheld an arbitration clause requiring arbitration of statutory rights under United
States antitrust laws in Japan by Japanese arbitration rules because the FAA and
the antitrust laws did not limit or prohibit arbitration of antitrust claims. The Su-
preme Court said:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the subs-
tantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and op-
portunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration. We must assume that if Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be de-
ducible from text or legislative history."
2. Courts Also Enforced Arbitration Clauses Based on the Theory That the
Contract Evidenced the Parties' Intent
The Supreme Court's second basis for upholding arbitration clauses was the
basic contract principle of enforcing the agreement the parties signed. The Su-
preme Court in Stolt-Nielsen spent a good deal of energy reviewing its past deci-
sions based on this principle. This discussion started with Volt v. Board of Trus-
tees of Leland Stanford Junior University,52 in which the Court stated "that the
FAA's central purpose is to ensure that 'private agreements to arbitrate are en-
48. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).
49. See Hall Street Assocs, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 592 (2008) (refusing to allow parties
to contractually expand review); see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43
(1995) (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37).
50. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (asserting
claims under the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws, among other statutory claims).
51. Id. at 628 (citations omitted).
52. Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,479 (1989).
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forced according to their terms."'53 The Stolt-Nielsen Court went on to quote Volt
for the proposition that courts and arbitrators construing or enforcing arbitration
clauses must "give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the par-
ties."54 The Court equated arbitration clauses to any other contract, stating "as
with any other contract, the parties' intentions control.""
Much more recently in the collective bargaining setting, the Supreme Court
has also expanded the role of arbitration. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,56 the
Court enforced an arbitration clause for age discrimination in employment claims
where the collective bargaining agreement clearly and unmistakably required
union members to arbitrate Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
claims, severely limiting Gardner-Denver.57
3. Businesses Used This Opportunity to Insert All-Encompassing Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Commercial, Consumer, and Employment Contracts
As courts moved from hostility to arbitration to a more "hands off' approach,
businesses began inserting arbitration clauses in various types of agreements,
including employment and consumer agreements. Over time, the Supreme Court
stopped making a clear distinction in enforceability between commercial and indi-
vidual arbitration. For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate-Johnson Lane in 1991, the
Supreme Court held that employees could be required to arbitrate their statutorily
protected rights under the ADEA, almost directly contradicting its holding in
Bernhardt."
The Court in Gilmer specifically rejected the argument that arbitration clauses
relating to ADEA claims should not be enforced because there is often unequal
bargaining power between employers and employees (an argument applicable to
many employment and consumer agreements). "Mere inequality in bargaining
power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are
never enforceable in the employment context."59  Instead, the Court held that
courts should "'remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to
arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that
53. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010).
54. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773.
55. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626). The Court in Stolt-Nielsen cited these cases to
presage its decision that arbitrators cannot apply their own policy reasons to read in procedural protec-
tions not specified in the parties' arbitration agreement; i.e., arbitrators cannot allow class actions
where the parties' contract does not authorize them. Id. at 1776-77 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960)) ("[Aln arbitrator 'has no general charter to administer
justice for a community which transcends the parties' but rather is 'part of a system of self-government
created by and confined to the parties."').
56. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1459-60 (2009).
57. Id. at 1469, 1474. For an overview of the history of arbitration in the collective bargaining
world, as well as the effect of 14 Penn Plaza on both employees and employers, see Brendan D.
Cummins and Nicole M. Blissenbach, The Law of the Land in Labor Arbitration: The Impact of 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159, 160-63 (2010). See also Mark S. Mathison
and Bryan M. Seilor, What 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett Means for Employers: Balancing Interests in
a Landscape of Uncertainty, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 173, 174-77 (2010).
58. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). But see Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956).
59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.
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would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract." 60 The Court failed to
address the reality that a contract of adhesion, coupled with a process that pro-
vides less protection than the judicial system, creates inherent problems for parties
who likely will never have bargaining power to protect themselves.
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson6 1
brought arbitration even farther from its roots, as the Court held that arbitration
agreements in consumer contracts were enforceable.62 In Terminix, the Supreme
Court was asked to interpret the meaning of the FAA's provision that courts must
enforce arbitration provisions in contracts "involving commerce."63  The Court
found that the legislative history of the FAA revealed Congress' intent that "con-
trol over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate ship-
ment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce."64 Terminix held
that the FAA applied to the full extent of the Commerce Clause, not just to con-
tracts involving actual interstate transactions. The decision in Terminix did not
address the unequal bargaining power of the parties; it did not need to-Gilmer
set out the standard of enforcing arbitration agreements against parties with un-
equal bargaining power except in limited circumstances.
During the 1980s and 1990s few cases voided arbitration agreements due to
unequal bargaining power. Instead, the courts acknowledged that, while perhaps
it is procedurally unconscionable to require someone to agree to arbitration who
has little or no bargaining power, if arbitration provided the same basic protec-
tions as litigation, requiring parties to arbitrate is not substantively unconsciona-
ble.66
III. COURTS BEGAN TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
AND LESS POWERFUL COMMERCIAL ENTITIES67
With this change from arbitration agreements agreed upon by merchants ne-
gotiating at arms' length to less powerful merchants, consumers, and employees
being informed that they could "take-it-or-leave-it," i.e., agree to arbitration or not
get the job, the credit card, the loan, the business, etc.; courts faced new chal-
lenges. In addition, long-standing arbitration clauses in business-to-business con-
tracts sometimes left one party without an effective means of redress where the
contracting parties could not foresee that, many years down the road, some of the
60. Id at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985)).
61. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
62. Id. at 268.
63. Id. at 268-74; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2.
64. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., 513 U.S. at 274 (quoting 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (remarks of
Rep. Graham)).
65. Id. at 281.
66. See, e.g., In re Media Arts Group, Inc., 116 S.W.3d 900, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 2003); Armendariz
v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (2000).
67. This note does not address the issue of whether the courts did or should have severed the unen-
forceable clause, rejected the entire arbitration agreement based on the unenforceable clause, or treated
the claims as not arbitrable. For full treatment on this issue, see David S. Schwartz, Understanding
Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 49, 50 (2003); Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability Doctrine and
Its Consequences, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 40, 41-43 (2007).
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problems faced by parties in arbitration would differ from those originally antic-
ipated by the contracting parties.6 8
Section 2 of the FAA allows courts to invalidate arbitration clauses "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."69
Frequently, when courts refuse to enforce arbitration clauses, they base their deci-
sions on the state law contract concept of "unconscionability." The Supreme
Court in 1889 defined an unconscionable contract as "one that 'no man in his
senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and
honest man would accept on the other."'70 That definition has changed over time
because it does not address today's unconscionable contracts, where individuals
and even companies have little choice but to accept what they would not, in their
"senses," otherwise accept because they will not be able to conduct the business,
get the loan or credit card or, especially in today's economy, the job, unless they
agree to it. Yet powerful corporations today freely draft contracts that "no honest
man would accept." More importantly, as will be discussed later, our Supreme
Court has encouraged this practice by enforcing arbitration clauses that anyone in
1889 would have deemed unconscionable on both grounds.
California and several other courts have invalidated arbitration clauses they
found unconscionable under state law on a variety of bases. The analysis often
starts by determining that the contract is one of adhesion, which usually requires a
showing that the drafter has significantly more bargaining power than the signee
and that the contract was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.71 If the contract is
one of adhesion, courts look for one or more further indicia of unconscionability,72
such as limiting remedies by contract, despite statutory provisions allowing for
such damages. 73  In determining whether such a limitation is unconscionable,
68. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (2010), where a
long-standing "charter party" or contract controlling shipping terms, written before anyone contem-
plated the far-reaching effects of today's arbitration clauses, did not address class actions. Due to the
Supreme Court's recent rulings, plaintiff and others affected by the alleged antitrust activity of the
shipper have no realistic forum in which to protect their rights.
69. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., 513 U.S. at 273 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (emphasis in original).
70. Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 406 (1889) (citing BOUVIER's LAW DIcTIONARY (1856), available
at http://www.constitution.org/bouv/bouvieru.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010)).
71. See, e.g., Arnendariz, 6 P.3d 689; Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 36245, 2010
WL 2560036, at * 10 (Idaho June 28, 2010) ("Indicators of procedural unconscionability generally
include a lack of voluntariness and a lack of knowledge .... A provision is substantively unconscion-
able if it is a bargain no reasonable person would make or that no fair and honest person would ac-
cept.") (citations omitted); Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 669 (S.C. 2007).
72. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) ("When an
arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute, therefore, the arbitra-
tion clause is not enforceable.") (citing Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir.
1997)); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-29 (1991) (invalidating
arbitration clause that included Title Vll claims but limited remedies available); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (stating in dicta that an arbitration proceeding that does not protect statuto-
ry rights might be invalidated as against public policy, but finding the issue premature because the
arbitrator had not yet decided the claims).
73. Even with the Supreme Court's hands-off approach, the Court interpreted an ambiguous clause
against the drafter and allowed an arbitrator to award punitive damages in Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc. 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (holding that it doubted petitioners, signing a standard
form contract, believed they were giving up such a "substantive right"); see also Stirlen v. Super Cuts,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 150-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (asserting that a clause limiting damages to actual
damages and specifically precluding any other damages is not enforceable); see Whitney v. Alitel
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courts do not require exactly the same remedies-just sufficient remedies to effec-
tuate the purpose of the statute.74
Courts also refuse to enforce arbitration clauses (or portions of them) based
on policy grounds-generally that the statutory protections provided by the law
under which the claimant is suing cannot be protected if the provision is enforced.
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that arbitration agreements including fee-
shifting clauses-meaning the claimant pays some or all the arbitration costs,
including the arbitrator's fees-are per se unenforceable because they would pre-
vent individuals from being able to pursue claims, particularly because they could
pursue the same claims in court without paying anything but filing fees.7s Courts
also stepped in to void or refuse to enforce arbitration clauses drafted by compa-
nies using arbitration to: limit liability,76 prohibit discovery,77 make clauses overly
one-sided or make bringing a claim too much trouble, 8 and require one party to
go to arbitration, while the other could still pursue claims in court.79
California has taken the lead in trying to protect consumers, at least, from
onerous arbitration provisions, and courts in other states have stepped in when
large companies clearly crossed the line. One of the issues California addressed
was forum selection clauses, or choice of law provisions, in arbitration clauses. In
Commc'ns Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (determining that arbitration provisions
cannot preclude consequential damages). But see Pacific Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407
(2003) (holding that it is first for the arbitrator to determine whether the contract really prohibits statu-
tory allowable damages).
74. Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1365 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming arbitration after
concluding that foreign arbitral forum's different remedies met statutory purposes of deterrence be-
cause "the available remedies are adequate and the potential recoveries substantial"); see also Martens
v. Smith Barney, 181 F.R.D. 243, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to sign off on a class action settle-
ment that would result in individual arbitrations unless the arbitrations provided sufficient remedial
safeguards) ("No statutes require arbitrations to mimic all the procedural formalities of federal courts,
but under Title VII, arbitrations cannot disallow remedies central to the Title VII scheme. Arbitration
agreements prospectively waiving such central remedies are unenforceable.").
75. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
76. Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding
that a contract clause limiting damages to the cost of the trip purchased from defendant, requiring
plaintiff to indemnify defendant for attorneys fees, and setting the forum in California when plaintiff
lived in Colorado, was unenforceable. The court also held that the entire arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because it showed that the defendant "designed its arbitration clause 'not simply as an
alternative to litigation, but as an inferior forum' that would give it an advantage." Id. (quoting Ar-
mendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697 (2000)).
77. See, e.g., Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682 (holding that agreements to arbitrate at least public policy
disputes must provide for discovery). But see Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding that parties to an arbitration have no right to pre-trial discovery, although the arbitrators may
subpoena documents and witnesses for the hearing); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31 (holding that
limited discovery did not void arbitration clauses).
78. See, e.g., Morrison v. Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (asserting that the drafter
of an arbitration clause has the discretion to establish and unilaterally change the arbitration rules);
Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (determining that arbitration can be held in a state different from where the par-
ties reside). For a more complete discussion of unconscionable arbitration clauses, see Brief for Pro-
fessional Arbitrators and Arbitration Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Rent-a-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-494), 2010 WL 1393445.
79. Cordova v. World Fin. Corp., 208 P.3d 901, 908-09 (N.M. 2009) (lender required borrower to
arbitrate all claims, but left itself the choice of going to court); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Archer, 147
S.W.3d 681, 687 (Ark. 2004) (holding that arbitration cannot be used to shield one party from litiga-
tion while allowing the other to pursue judicial remedies).
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America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County,80 the California Su-
preme Court invalidated a clause that required the arbitrators to apply Virginia law
to an arbitration in California, undoubtedly chosen because Virginia law prohi-
bited class actions. The court reasoned that the forum selection clause would
substantially diminish the rights of California residents in a way that would violate
the state's public policy.8' Choosing a forum or applying law that prohibits class
actions in essence exempted AOL from liability for overcharging customers small
amounts because, without the possibility of a class action, few, if any, customers
would bring claims for recovery.82
In addition, some perhaps unexpected problems arose after arbitration had
been in use for a number of years. These problems include unfair bias toward
repeat customers by arbitrators,8  exorbitant costs that preclude small merchants
and individuals from pursuing claims, 84 and delay or other tactics by wealthy or
powerful parties designed to make it too costly (both time-wise and monetarily)
for individuals and small companies to pursue arbitration.
The difficult question the courts began to address was how to protect power-
less consumers from companies seeking to limit liability, avoid creating
precedent, and hide wrongdoing in private arbitration. The courts are just starting
to address the next issue-whether and how to protect sophisticated individuals
and businesses from waiving judicial protections or statutorily protected rights by
signing contracts of adhesion containing arbitration clauses.
Still, the Supreme Court, at least, has acted cautiously--continuing to enforce
arbitration agreements unless the complaining party made a strong and specific
showing of unconscionability. For example, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, the Supreme Court stated that a party that could show it
could not afford the costs of pursuing claims in arbitration might convince a court
not to enforce an arbitration clause, but it set the burden high. The Court held that
"where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground
80. Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 714-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
81. Id. at 708.
82. Id at. 711-12.
83. See Brief of the National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, in Pacificare Health Sys., 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (No. 02-215), 2003 WL 133135 (review-
ing several studies that show significantly different outcomes in arbitrations of consumer claims
against HMOs in arbitration than in litigation (e.g., the brief discusses a study by an HMO showing
that arbitrators are twenty times more likely to grant summary judgment in favor of the corporation
than is a court, and another study of National Arbitration Forum shortly before its demise showing that
at least one bank reported prevailing in over 19,000 cases while the consumer prevailed in only eighty
seven, a 99.6% success rate)). But see Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer Arbitration Before the
American Arbitration Association-Preliminary Report (2009), available at
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/searlecenter/uploads/Consumer/20Arbitration%20fullreport.pdf
(discussing an independent study of cases handled by the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
that asserts that, when following AAA procedures, consumers prevail about half the time and finding
no repeat-player prejudice).
84. In re Media Arts Group, Inc., 116 S.W.3d 900,911 (Tex. App. 2003) (citing Armendariz, 6 P.3d
at 689).
85. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards, Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 735 F.Supp. 1463, 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(upholding arbitrator's award of attorneys fees against Cunard where it filed numerous motions in
different federal courts and refused to attend the arbitration proceedings); see also Lhotka, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 851-52.
86. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2002).
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that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of
showing the likelihood of incurring such costs." The Court refused to invalidate
the clause because Randolph, who raised and argued the claims, failed to provide
proof of such prohibitive costs.8 7
A. Courts Distinguish Between Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Par-
ties,88 but Don't Offer Sufficient Guidance
Various courts, including the Supreme Court, have looked at levels of sophis-
tication, equality of bargaining power, and the voluntariness with which parties
entered into arbitration clauses in considering whether to enforce the clauses. The
courts use these terms almost interchangeably and rarely provide a sufficient ex-
planation as to what they mean so that other courts can follow their reasoning.
1. The Supreme Court did not Expand the Protections it Believed Congress
Provided in the FAA
In response to an argument that Congress intended that section 1 of the FAA
be read to exclude all employment contracts, the Supreme Court instead read the
exemption narrowly. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, the
Court pointed out that the FAA specifically exempts employment contracts for
"seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," 89 but the Court interpreted that language narrowly to ex-
empt just workers with jobs involving commerce, such as transportation jobs. In
making this finding the Supreme Court "note[d] that categories of contracts oth-
erwise within the Arbitration Act but in which one of the parties characteristically
has little bargaining power are expressly excluded from the reach of the Act."90 In
other words, the majority of the Supreme Court Justices believed in 1967 that the
FAA's specific but narrowly defined exemptions showed that Congress thought
about the unequal bargaining power concern and addressed it by making very
limited specific exemptions. Justice Black dissented, quoting extensively from the
legislative history to support his argument that the FAA's exceptions should be
interpreted broadly.9' Specifically, he discussed Senator Walsh's expressed con-
cerns about insurance contracts, employment agreements, construction, and ship-
ping agreements, where the arbitration agreement was typically offered on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, and really was not entered into voluntarily. 92 Apparently the
87. Id. at 92.
88. See Miller, supra note 5, at 501-18 (where the author reviewed contract cases (not necessarily
with arbitration clauses) and found a significant increase in the number of cases that make this distinc-
tion). Taking the same search in Westlaw's "allcases" database and adding "arbitration /10" of "con-
tract" or "agreement" retrieved ninety-eight cases, two from the 1970s, eight from the 1980s, twenty-
one from the 1990s and sixty-seven in the last ten years.
89. 9 U.S. C. § 1.
90. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 (1967).
91. Id. at 409-10 (contending that the majority's broad interpretation of the language included in the
exemption for employment contracts of workers "engaged in commerce' in the Arbitration Act is
inaccurate).
92. Id. at 413-14 (quoting Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes, Joint Hearings on S. 1005
and H.R. 646 Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., 15
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Senator was assured by the bill's drafters that the FAA was not intended to cover
those types of disputes.93 The Court ignored this history, and did not address all
of the other individuals or corporations with which Senator Walsh was concerned,
each of whom had similarly little bargaining power compared with seamen, rail-
road workers, and other workers involved in interstate commerce who were spe-
cifically exempted.
The Court in Gilmer reiterated the refusal to narrow the application of the
FAA, holding specifically that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however,
is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable
in the employment context."94 The Court emphasized that contract law grounds
could be used to invalidate contracts signed under fraudulent or coercive circums-
tances, but pointed out that there was no evidence that Mr. Gilmer, "a sophisti-
cated businessman," was coerced or defrauded into signing the arbitration
clause.95 In other words, the Supreme Court was not at all concerned with the
adhesive nature of arbitration agreements, despite the fact that, unlike adhesive
contracts enforced or rejected by courts, parties in arbitration have limited discov-
ery, no jury, virtually no appeal, and no right to class actions. Arguably, the Su-
preme Court could have avoided a lot of the problems that some Senators foresaw
in the employment context by interpreting the FAA to exempt all employment
contracts rather than interpreting it to apply broadly to employment contracts as it
did in Circuit City Stores v. Adam.96
Of course, had the Supreme Court broadly applied the assurances Senator
Walsh sought, arbitration would be very different than it is today. It would not
apply in construction contracts, where most likely the building owner (at least in a
commercial setting) has vastly more power than the general contractor, who has
dramatically more power than the subcontractors. Yet the construction industry
was one of the first to adopt arbitration as a means for resolving disputes and al-
lowing them to get on with their work.97 And the parties in Stolt-Nielsen did not
appear to be arguing that the charter parties (shipping contracts) that had required
arbitration for the last fifty or more years should not be enforced. Instead, they
simply sought a venue for protecting rights no one foresaw being enforced
through arbitration. Insurance companies, also addressed by Senator Walsh, pre-
sently engage in significant amounts of arbitration with customers despite Justice
Black and Senator Walsh's concerns about whether arbitration should be allowed
in such "take-it-or-leave-it" cases. Used as intended, arbitration offers a quick and
efficient way to determine claims, a big advantage for companies that often find
themselves involved in legal disputes.
(1924); Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9-11 (1923)).
93. Id. at 411 n.2.
94. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
95. Id.
96. Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 115-16 (2001); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (alluding to
the answer provided in Circuit City, but refusing to address the issue directly).
97. JoHN C. CAMERON, PRACTIONER's GUIDE TO CONSGRUCTION LAW, p. 19-1 & n.3 (2000).
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2. Lower Courts Remain "Hands off' with Respect to Arbitration Agree-
ments Signed by "Sophisticated Parties"
A federal district court in Texas may have expressed the reason for the hands
off approach to arbitration contracts between sophisticated parties most simply:
It is difficult for the Court to understand why sophisticated business enti-
ties-or anyone for that matter-would contract away their right to resolve
their disputes in the courts in favor of having them resolved by persons
not bound by the hallmarks of the judicial process, such as the rules of
evidence and the right to appeal. Nonetheless, in this case, we have two
sophisticated business entities that obviously knew or should have known
what they were doing. Having expressly agreed to arbitration in its con-
tract for insurance, [plaintiff] must now reap what it has sown and submit
its claims in that forum.98
This blanket enforcement indicates a lack of appreciation for the difference in
bargaining power between these parties. Yes, a company can negotiate some
terms with its insurer, such as coverage, but arbitration has become a standard,
non-negotiable term. Courts often look to what we as companies and as individu-
als have come to expect to determine whether to enforce arbitration clauses.99 We
certainly have come to expect that insurance companies and others have standard
form arbitration clauses in all their contracts. 00 That expectation simply shows
resignation, not intent to agree, as the Court looked for in Stolt-Nielsen. It would
be surprising if any but the most sophisticated (meaning biggest dollar) of sophis-
ticated clients have any ability to negotiate around arbitration clauses. And those
clients probably do not need to.
In the case quoted at the beginning of this note, In re Knepp, the court found
that an adhesive arbitration clause requiring a consumer to pay part of the filing
fees and arbitration costs was unconscionable given a potentially better free sys-
tem provided by the court system.'0 The court lamented that the Supreme Court
had expanded arbitration to include consumer cases rather than simply cases Con-
gress originally intended to cover-contracts between equally sophisticated par-
ties who did not have to give up their constitutional rights in order to enter the
marketplace.102 In Knepp, the court was not faced with sophisticated parties who
were forced to give up their rights in order to enter the marketplace.
98. Michael Angelo's Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co, No. A-05-CA-912-SS, 2006 WL
2241225, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2006).
99. See Blue Springs Internal Med., P.C. v. Blue Cross (In re Managed Care Litig.), No. 00-1334-
MD, 2009 WL 855963 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2009), discussed infra note 106.
100. Id.
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B. Courts Apply the "Sophisticated Party " Distinction to Individuals as
Well as Corporations
The Florida district court in In Re Managed Care Litigation,'03 addressed
head-on many of the arguments regarding enforcing arbitration agreements or
specific provisions of arbitration agreements in the context of sophisticated par-
ties, but did not provide much guidance for future cases. In that case, several
groups of physicians sued a number of insurance providers, asserting that the pro-
viders systematically deny, delay, and minimize payment of patient health care
charges that should be covered by insurance.'4 The physicians tried to bring the
action in court rather than in arbitration, as required by their insurance contracts.
The court pointed out that it can invalidate arbitration agreements (just as it can
invalidate any contract) if the arbitration provisions are unconscionable, but re-
fused to find the arbitration clause unconscionable. 05
Some of the factors the physicians argued weighed against enforceability
were:
* the contract or clause was offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis,
* the clause was on a pre-printed form or boilerplate in a contract drawn
by the party in the strongest economic position,
* the clause was hidden on the back of the contract,
* there was an inequality of bargaining power between the parties,
* the arbitrator had no discretion to award arbitration expenses to the
prevailing party, and
* the clause precluded certain types of damages.106
In other words, the physicians made the same arguments that consumers and
employees regularly make successfully.
The court in In re Managed Care rejected these arguments, explaining that
courts distinguish between an average consumer and more sophisticated parties
when determining whether to enforce an arbitration agreement. 0 7 In this case, the
court said, it must "initially view the Plaintiffs' claims with some skepticism. . ."
due to the complaining parties' sophistication, and "absent clear and convincing
evidence that the agreements are unconscionable . . .we are compelled to enforce"
the arbitration clause.108 In other words, the court set a very high standard for
unconscionability of contracts signed by sophisticated parties. Unfortunately, it
did not define "sophisticated."
The court then went on to analyze both procedural and substantive uncons-
cionability. Under procedural unconscionability, the court determined that the
fact that the contract was one of adhesion, offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis,
103. In re Managed Care Litig., 2009 WL 855963.
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1995)
("[A]n arbitration clause may be invalid ... if, for example, it is procured through fraud or forgery;
there is a mutual mistake or impossibility; the provision is unconscionable . . . .")).
106. In re Managed Care Litig., 2009 WL 855963, at *4 (relying on Whitney v. Alltel Commc'ns
Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating consumer contract based on similar
concerns)).
107. In re Managed Care Litig., 2009 WL 855963, at *4.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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was relevant only if the parties entered into the contract without knowingly and
voluntarily consenting to all of its terms.' Because the clause was in bold and all
caps above the signature line and because the "Plaintiffs-as sophisticated practic-
ing physicians-have undoubtedly dealt with numerous contracts that contain
binding arbitration agreements," the court found the physicians' agreement know-
ing and voluntary. 0
Second, the court found that refusing to enforce boiler-plate provisions would
"slow commerce to a crawl,""' and that the average person would "expect that
disputes arising out of an agreement like this might have to be resolved in arbitra-
tion.""'2 The court made short shrift of the unequal bargaining power argument:
In order for a court to rescind an agreement based on a claim of uncons-
cionability due to an inequality of bargaining power, the moving party
must demonstrate that, due to its diminished bargaining power, it had no
choice but to sign the agreement (i.e. that they were unable to contract
with other health insurance companies)." 3
It also did not address the fact that physicians, like the rest of us, have little
bargaining power over whether their insurance agreements contain arbitration
clauses. The physician can choose not to accept various insurance plans, but re-
fusing to do business with insurance companies that deny or delay payments
would simply put physicians out of business.
When explaining substantive unconscionability as it differs from consumers
to sophisticated parties, the court gave no weight to the argument that making the
physicians pay for part of the arbitration costs should invalidate the agreement.14
And unlike the courts that have held that consumers should not be prohibited from
statutorily mandated damages, the court in In re Managed Care enforced the con-
tract as the providers wrote it-waiving damages, rights, and all."'
In analyzing substantive unconscionability, the court did not address a dis-
tinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties. The court simply en-
forced the arbitration agreement. The court ignored the fact that doctors, while
they may choose not to participate in insurance plans, have little bargaining power
109. Id at *5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *5 n.6.
112. Id. (quoting Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)).
113. In re Managed Care Litig., 2009 WL 855963, at *6.
114. Id. (relying on Green Tree Fin. Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (1lth Cir. 1999),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that potentially high arbitration costs
invalidated the arbitration clause, and distinguishing other cases that rejected the same argument on the
basis that those cases involved commercial entities, not small consumer transactions or employment
contracts). The Supreme Court reversed, finding that, while high costs could invalidate an arbitration
clause, Randolph had not demonstrated them. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, suggested that the case simply required remand to allow Randolph to show the high costs, and
pointed out that Gilmer, which the court relied on in enforcing the arbitration clause, involved a pro-
gram where the employer paid all the costs and Justice Ginsburg questioned whether the Court's deci-
sion would or should have been the same given the consumer/employee, take-it-or-leave-it clause
presented in Gilmer. 531 U.S. at 94.
115. In re Managed Care Litig., 2009 WL 855963, at *7 (quoting Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59
F.3d 1186, 1193 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[Plarties wishing to avoid the imposition of punitive damages
in arbitration may simply expressly exclude punitive damages in the arbitration agreement.")).
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over the policies chosen by their patients. Even a large group of doctors has diffi-
culty negotiating with Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS), and refusing to participate
in a BCBS insurance plan would almost certainly ensure that the physicians' prac-
tice would suffer irreparably. As always, of course, the patients suffer most-if
their doctors refuse to take certain insurance plans, patients must find new doctors.
If the doctors continue to accept the plans that continue to refuse to pay or delay
payment, patients end up paying the difference and for any increased cost of doing
business. Some doctors refuse to file insurance for patients, requiring patients to
pay up front and file their own claims for repayment. As always, the consumers
end up harmed by the insurance companies' power. This decision simply allows
the harm to continue unchecked.
One recent example of a court establishing a bright line rule but not address-
ing how that line works is the case of Dime Bank v. Merrill Lynch.'16 In Dime
Bank, the Connecticut Superior Court expressed little patience with banks trying
to get out of clearly written arbitration agreements, despite the fact that the agree-
ments were written by securities brokers who allegedly encouraged the banks to
buy risky securities knowing that the market was tanking. The court applied prior
state supreme court precedent holding that "a presumption that the language used
is definitive arises when . . . the contract at issue is between sophisticated parties
and is commercial in nature." 1 7 The court also looked at federal and state court
cases applying the FAA and discussed the strong presumption in favor of arbitra-
tion at both levels. 18 Despite the arguably overbroad wording of the arbitration
agreement the parties signed, the court held:
[I]t is what these sophisticated corporate parties agreed to at the time. In
the absence of fraud in the making of a contract, or a showing of bad
faith in obtaining the assent of a party to its terms, the courts, as noted
earlier, cannot unmake bargains that in hindsight turn out to be unwisely
made from the perspective of one of the sophisticated parties to that bar-
gain."9
The interesting question left by this case, which has no subsequent history,
and was not published by the court, is what the court would have done differently
if individuals or unsophisticated parties challenged such an agreement. If one
unsophisticated party (consumer, employee) unquestionably and not under duress
agreed to a contract with clear terms that later turned out to be a bad deal, would
the court refuse to enforce the bargain? On what grounds? If not, why make the
distinction?
Arguably, of course, in the case before the court, both sophisticated parties
understood the terms and agreed to them. In reality, most likely, one party wrote
the onerous clause and the other agreed to it, knowing that it met societal expecta-
116. Dime Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. X05CV094017091S, 2010 WL
628908 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2010).
117. Id. at *7 (quoting William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Newtown Group Props., LP, 898 A.2d 265,
269 (Conn. App. Ct. (2006)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted in origi-
nal).
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tions and that a court would enforce it, even if it meant that the company could not
pursue claims that might affect unwitting consumers. Courts should not place the
burden on the bankers to negotiate to avoid arbitration where arbitration is being
used to hide allegations of bad acts from the public. We have too strong a public
interest in letting consumers and businesses know whether and which stockbrok-
ers are acting in bad faith, i.e., taking money that ultimately belongs to consumers,
to put the onus on the negotiating party to protect that interest.
C. Courts Even Apply The "Sophisticated Parties" Distinction to
Employment Disputes
To confuse the argument even further, the Nevada Supreme Court enforced
an arbitration clause in an employment agreement because it found that the plain-
tiff, a "financial relationship manager" for Bank of America and Bank of America
Investment Services was a "sophisticated party" who voluntarily signed her em-
ployment agreement and failed to prove that she could not negotiate the agreement
or have counsel review it.120 Despite the court's assumption of sophistication in
those who hold Series 7 (General Securities) licenses, the court provided no guid-
ance on the weight it gave to this plaintiffs sophistication or how to determine in
the future whether it would treat differently sophisticated and unsophisticated
parties who protest arbitration clauses. Is it simply whether they were allowed to
negotiate them? If so, the level of sophistication has little to do with it. If the
bank allowed an employee to negotiate, knowing that the bank's lawyers could
negotiate circles around the office cleaners, administrative staff, and possibly even
the CEO, the employees would still sign contracts that insufficiently protect both
their own and the public interest. Should there be a distinction between staff and
executives? Skilled jobs and unskilled? This decision provides no guidance.
The Bank ofAmerica case is like State ex rel Wells v. Matish,121 in which the
West Virginia Supreme Court enforced an arbitration agreement against a televi-
sion anchor because he was "sophisticated," but really because he was allowed to
negotiate his contract. The same court distinguished Wells soon thereafter in a
case where the "unsophisticated" employee had only a tenth-grade education.122
Although the court found it important to point out the employee's lack of educa-
tion, it appears that the real factor the court relied on was the employee's inability
to negotiate. Unlike Wells, the plaintiff in the second case was given the form
contract on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 123 The court described the plaintiffs lack of
education and assertion that she had little understanding of the law and arbitra-
120. Whitemaine v. Aniskovich, 183 P.3d 137, 144 (Nev. 2008).
121. State ex rel. Wells v. Matish, 600 S.E.2d 583, 589 (W.Va. 2004).
122. State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914, 922 (W.Va. 2005). Of course, making a distinc-
tion based on education level simply cannot work. Richard Branson, founder of Virgin Records and
Virgin Atlantic Airlines, left school at sixteen. TIM JACKSON, RICHARD BRANSON, VIRGIN KING:
INSIDE RICHARD BRANSON'S BUSINEss EMPIRE 425 (1996). Bill Gates (Microsoft) and Steve Jobs
(Apple) did not finish college. STEPHEN MANES & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES: [-OW MICROSOFT'S
MOGUL REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY-AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 1 (1993);
RANDALL E. STROSS, STEVE JOBS AND THE NEXT BIG THING 109 (1993).
123. Saylor, 613 S.E.2d at 922.
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tion,124 then refused to enforce the arbitration clause, finding the bargaining power
"grossly unequal."l 25 The court did not explain how a more educated employee
would have more bargaining power over a contract proffered on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis. Is this court's rule that really big companies cannot require low level-
undefined-employees to sign arbitration agreements but they can require higher
level employees to? If the drafter was a smaller corporation and the signee was a
low level employee with a college degree, would the court hold any differently?
In its present formulation, this "sophisticated party" distinction provides an
unworkable solution, as demonstrated by a district court in Indiana that tried to
reconcile two "sophisticated party" cases and apply them to a third, which appar-
ently fell right in between. In Abbott v. Lexford Apartment Services, Inc.' 6 the
court distinguished between several cases involving arbitration clauses in em-
ployment agreements based in part on the type of jobs the employees performed,
even though one decision did not even specify the job. In the first case, in which
the court refused to enforce the clause, the employee was a restaurant server-a
"fungible commodity." 27 In Abbott, the employee was a maintenance worker at
an apartment complex, "a position presumably requiring . .. skill," so he was not
fungible.'2 ' And in the third case, in which the earlier court had upheld the arbi-
tration clause, the court did not even say what kind of job the employee held.129
Of course, in Abbott, as in the other cases, the court threw in the sophistication
analysis as part of its overall justification for enforcing the agreement against the
maintenance worker but not the restaurant server.
In Abbott, the court was comfortable with the employer's choice of arbitration
provider (American Arbitration Association), where both parties got a say in
choosing the arbitrator, and with the length and availability of the arbitration
clause for review prior to signing. The court found no "gross inequality" in bar-
gaining power, drawing upon earlier decisions to note that "[a] party does not
need to be a sophisticated business-person or have an advanced education to be
bound by an arbitration agreement."l 30 The court correctly pointed out that, "[i]f
we were to find that no low-level employee can be held to an arbitration agree-
ment due to a supposed disparity in bargaining power between the employer and
employee, then most arbitration agreements to resolve employment disputes
would be rendered ineffective," which would be contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in Circuit City that the benefits of the arbitration process apply in the
employment context.'3 '
The court did not address the fact that a maintenance worker's sophistication
presumably applies to fixing things rather than understanding legal documents or
that he would not have gotten the job if he did not sign the agreement. In other
124. Of course, lack of knowledge of the law is no defense, but knowingly giving up rights because
you have no power to negotiate otherwise results in the same inability to protect rights as unknowingly
giving up rights.
125. Saylor, 613 S.E.2d at 922-23.
126. 2002 WL 1800320 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
127. Id. at *5 (citing Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F.Supp. 2d 985, 998 (S.D. Ind.
2001)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Flynn v. Aerchem, Inc., 102 F.Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (S.D. Ind. 2000)).
130. Id. n.2 (quoting Kreimer v. Delta Faucet Co., 2000 WL 962817, at *5 (S.D. Ind. 2000)).
131. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E. 144 (Ind. 1971)).
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words, the court did not provide guidance to the administrative assistant, the retail
manager, or the many other employees who, while skilled, educated, and intelli-
gent, may not be sophisticated in understanding that they are waiving their right to
have a jury hear their discrimination claims. And even if they were so sophisti-
cated, they could do nothing about it, just as merchants have no power to tell
American Express that they will take its charge cards but not its one-sided agree-
ment.
IV. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO LEAVE ARBITRATION TO SOPHISTICATED
PARTIES BARGAINING AT ARMS' LENGTH HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED
From its inception, arbitration has offered important advantages for compa-
nies and for individuals searching for alternative ways to resolve their disputes.
The search now remains for ways to return arbitration to its original intent-a
voluntary process that addresses definable disputes without forcing every dispute
through the court system or through preliminary motions with the arbitrator just to
get the dispute heard.
A. Congress Has Started to Address Some of the Issues Surrounding Pro-
tecting Rights in Arbitration
Congress has tried to take a broad perspective on addressing this problem, but
has ended up making progress only in a few specific areas. Most recently, it
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,1 32
amending the 1934 Securities Exchange Act'3 3 in part to provide protections for
whistleblowers on financial mismanagement.' 34 The whistleblower provisions
state that "no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the
agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this section."' 3 - This law
goes directly to the issue of allowing big companies to hide their wrongdoing in
arbitration. Finally, Congress has recognized that we all have an interest in ensur-
ing public and judicial handling of matters such as those that caused our recent
economic crisis.
Also, on May 19, 2010, the Department of Defense issued an Interim Rule
implementing defense appropriation legislation prohibiting the use of funds made
available by the legislation for any contract in excess of $1 million unless the
defense contractor agrees not to require arbitration of Title VII or tort claims aris-
ing out of sexual harassment or assault as a condition of employment.' 36 This rule
emanates from the "Franken Amendment" to the defense appropriation bill, writ-
ten to provide judicial redress for future claims after an employee of a Halliburton
subsidiary alleged that she was raped by co-employees while working for the
company in Iraq. Although the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision
132. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 10, 2010).
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006).
134. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922 (2)(e)(2).
135. Id.
136. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Restrictions on the Use of Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 48 C.F.R. § 222.7401 (2010).
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not to require her to arbitrate her assault claims, though she still had to arbitrate
her discrimination claims,'37 the possibility that a crime as serious as rape could
be hidden by Halliburton in its confidential arbitration program provided the im-
petus Congress needed to provide this piecemeal protection.
1. Congress Considered Protections for Consumers and Employees
Before this legislation, though, Congress had made little progress on provid-
ing guidance on important arbitration issues such as how to protect consumers and
employees from over-reaching companies. In 2002, nine bills were introduced to
address arbitration of employment agreements, consumer contracts, franchisee
agreements, and motor vehicle purchases.13 8 Only the Motor Vehicle Franchise
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act,'3 9 first introduced in 1998, passed, exempting
motor vehicle dealers from mandatory arbitration with automobile manufactur-
ers.'" But the Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act of 2008, designed to exempt
consumers from mandatory arbitration of contract disputes with car dealers, did
not pass.141 The Fair Contracts for Growers Act, requiring consent to arbitration
after a dispute arises, also did not.142 The Consumer and Employee Arbitration
Bill of Rights gave way to the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002,143 followed by the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007,'" which was re-written as the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2009.14 None passed in 2009 despite a Democratic House, Senate,
and President. The Franken Amendment came from the Arbitration Fairness Act,
showing that Congress has taken at least a small, specific step.
The Alcohol Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2008, which
would require a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate even if the parties signed a
pre-dispute contract, did not pass.146  The Nursing Home Arbitration Act was
submitted to the House in February of 2009, submitted to the Judiciary Committee
for mark-up in June 2010, and was not passed.14 7
In his support for the 2002 Arbitration Fairness Act, Senator Sessions dis-
cussed the fact that arbitration works well for many disputes and that keeping
arbitration as an alternative is important because of skyrocketing legal costs.148
Rather than exempting employment or consumer claims from arbitration, the 2002
legislation proposed alleged safeguards: notice-a large print statement so a con-
137. Jones v. Halliburton, 583 F.3d 228, 242 (5th Cir. 2009).
138. Jon 0. Shirnabukuro, The Federal Arbitration Act: Background and Recent Developments, CRS
Report for Congress, CRS-7-8 (2002), http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/l191.pdf
(pointing out that a version of a bill to provide judicial redress for discrimination claims has been
introduced in every Congress since the 103rd (1993-1995)).
139. Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 1296, 107th Cong., Ist Sess.
(2001) (enacted).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)(2).
141. H.R. 5312, 110th Cong. (2008).
142. S. 91, 108th Cong. (2003).
143. S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002).
144. H.R. 3010, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
145. H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
146. H.R. 7076, 110th Cong. (2008).
147. H.R. 1237, 110th Cong. (2009).
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tracting party cannot miss the provision; the right for the non-drafter to choose the
law the state would apply; the right to representation: and a convenient forum, etc.
None of these provisions dealt with the class action problem that has become
much more prevalent in the past decade. None of them dealt with the reality that
parties still would not have actual negotiating power, so even if they now know
they have waived their constitutional right to a jury, they still cannot do anything
about it.
On the other hand, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, currently before
Congress, goes much further than the 2002 version. It exempts civil rights claims,
consumers, employees, and franchisees from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses.149 The Senate version of the bill also makes the determination of arbitra-
bility a question for the court, not the arbitrator, regardless of what the contract
says, 50 overturning in part the decision in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan.151
This bill would go a long way toward ensuring that individuals can avail them-
selves of the judicial process with its protections such as discovery, jury trials, and
appeals. And it leaves arbitration as an option, as long as the parties agree to arbi-
trate after the dispute arises. The proposed amended statute states that Congress
finds the following, which is consistent with the legislative history:
The Federal Arbitration Act . . . was intended to apply to disputes be-
tween commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bar-
gaining power. . . . A series of United States Supreme Court decisions
have changed the meaning of the Act so it now extends to disputes be-
tween parties of greatly disparate economic power, such as consumer
disputes and employment disputes.152
The proposed Act also includes franchisees, but does not specify why the
sponsors included franchisees in the exemptions, since franchisees arguably could
be sophisticated commercial entities. Once again, Congress made a distinction on
the basis of sophistication, then smudged the edges. It seems that the sponsors'
reasoning is the same as the reasoning behind the passage of the Motor Vehicle
Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act: the unequal bargaining power be-
149. Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, Sen. Proceedings and Debates of the 1 10th
Cong., Ist Sess., S4897-98 (April 29, 2009) (comments of Sen. Russ Feingold).
150. Proposed section 9(b)(1), S. 931 (introduced April 29, 2009) & H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (intro-
duced Feb. 12, 2009). The American Bar Association issued a resolution opposing the Act, in signifi-
cant part because it believes it will have a negative effect on international arbitration, which allows
arbitrators to make initial decisions. The Report accompanying the resolution argues that taking re-
view back to the courts slows the process, making American arbitration an undesirable option for
international players. Edna Sussman, Report accompanying Resolution on Arbitration Fairness Act,
(Aug. 25, 2009), http://businessconflictmanagement.com/blog/2009/08/aba-resolution-on-fairness-in-
arbitration-act/; See Edna Sussman, The Unintended Consequences of the Proposed Arbitration Fair-
ness Act, 56 FED. LAWYER 48, 49 (2009) (noting that the revised Act addresses most of her concerns).
The report is careful to say that it only addresses concerns with the effect on international arbitration.
Id. at 48; see also, Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
47 (2010) (calling the proposal "draconian" and referring to the 2007 bill's inclusion of exemptions for
contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power as having a potentially serious effect on busi-
ness-to-business arbitration, a provision not in the current proposal).
151. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (allowing parties to contract to
have the arbitrator decide issues of arbitrability if the language is "clear and unmistakable").
152. H.R. 1020, sec. 2; S. 931, sec. 2, 111th Cong. (2009).
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tween the motor vehicle manufacturer and the franchisee.15 3 If so, it should not be
so limited-any person or entity signing a contract of adhesion should not be
forced to give up statutorily protected rights because he or it agreed to arbitration.
A significant concern remains, however, that if the Arbitration Fairness Act
passes, small disputes, which may be easily and quickly handled in arbitration,
will end up with no forum. Even with attorneys' fees provisions, lawyers will not
pursue small, individual claims through litigation. Parties may also decide that the
costs of pursuing their claims-experts, time, court costs-are simply too high,
especially for claims that vindicate a right but for which recovery would be very
small.
Also, if this Act passes, employers will no longer need to offer to pay for ar-
bitration processes to make them fair, since parties will be able to choose not to
arbitrate.154 Companies that designed programs to ensure as unbiased arbitrators
as possible offer an important service-the small claims court-like efficiency of
hearing many small claims on settlement days or with a minimum of administra-
tion. It is unclear whether those programs will survive if so many parties can opt
out of arbitration.
It is also unclear whether businesses, faced with the choice after the dispute
arises of going through arbitration or forcing a consumer or employee into court,
will choose to force the party into court in the hopes that the potential plaintiff
will find the litigation process too overwhelming and drop the claim.
2. Congress has not Really Addressed Business-to-Business Arbitration
Clauses Other than Franchisees
The authors of the Arbitration Fairness Act address unequal bargaining power
for franchisees but not for small merchants, such as the ones in Amex v. Italian
Colors, and the doctors trying to get paid for taking care of consumers in In Re
Managed Care (or even large merchants who have no bargaining power). The
merchants and businesses have the same issues and same concerns as the consum-
er or employee-no right to bargain, suing a large, repeat customer with limited
choices of arbitrators, no judicial review, no class actions despite small damages
and a likelihood that no attorney will bring an individual claim for such small
damages.
One of the problems in addressing these concerns is that these "sophisticated"
entities are not clamoring for protection from all arbitration agreements. They
recognize the importance of the speed, efficiency, and expert decision-making to
their ability to run their business. What they are clamoring for is protection from
what the Supreme Court's recent decisions allow-large, powerful corporations
drafting one-sided contracts and presenting them to suppliers, merchants, franchi-
153. 148 CONG. REc. S4526-01 (May 17, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1004477 (comments of Sena-
tor Tom Dashchle) ("It is wrong for one party to take advantage of its raw negotiating power to limit
the legal rights of another party.").
154. DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION
WORKPLACE 291 (1989) (quoting corporate director of industrial relations at Northrop explaining why
Northrop pays arbitrators' fees: "[W]e bear the cost of the arbitration for the very practical reason that
most of the employees who seek arbitration of their grievances simply couldn't afford it if we did
not.").
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sees, consumers, and employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Just like consumers
and employees, businesses are trying to avoid allowing the big companies to use
those contracts to do whatever they want and get away with it.
The real problem, though, is that, despite Senator Sessions' admonishment
against piecemeal legislation while proposing the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2002, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 is still that. Senator Feingold specifi-
cally stated that it is designed not to change business-to-business arbitration.'5 5 So
it does not address the unequal bargaining power, the need to protect statutory
rights, the lack of precedent, or the long term effect that unfair limitations set out
in arbitration agreements' place on businesses such as the merchants in Italian
Colors, except with regard to franchisees. It does not solve the problem of arbitra-
tion being used by companies trying to "get away with" something.
The sponsors' intent is admirable: to "strengthen the arbitration system by re-
turning arbitration to a more equitable design that reflects the intent of the original
arbitration legislation, the Federal Arbitration Act."' 5 6 To accomplish that goal,
though, Congress or the courts must do more than exempt a few categories from
arbitration. It must remove from arbitration those rights that simply cannot al-
ways be protected in arbitration-statutory claims, especially where, for example,
only a class action can provide sufficient protection.
Another way Congress can protect rights is to ensure that the decision is not
made at the expense of public knowledge of corporate wrongdoing. If the parties
want to choose arbitration after a court has certified a class action, they should be
allowed to, but, just as in court, parties should not be allowed to agree to keep
arbitration issues and outcomes confidential where the outcome affects others who
are not parties to the arbitration. Examples include antitrust claims, discrimina-
tion, and financial wrongdoing by companies.
B. The Supreme Court Must Stop Enforcing Arbitration Clauses That Al-
low Powerful Corporations to Control the Justice Process
The Supreme Court has heard a significant number of arbitration cases in the
past few years, most of which are discussed throughout this article. In these re-
cent decisions, the Supreme Court has taken a very "hands off' approach to arbi-
tration agreements. As discussed below, the effect of leaving so much to arbitra-
tion based on the contract is that it allows the party that drafted the agreement to
effect substantive limitations by what appear to be procedural means.
1. Recent Supreme Court Cases Do Not Clarify the Distinction Between
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Parties
In the 2009/2010 term, the Supreme Court hinted at a distinction in enforcing
arbitration clauses against less sophisticated parties, but did not clarify it. Nor did
it apply the distinction when given an opportunity. In Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal-
Feeds International Corp.,'57 the Supreme Court refused to enforce a decision by
155. See supra note 149.
156. Id.
157. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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arbitrators to allow a class action where the arbitration agreement was silent re-
garding class actions. The Court reasoned that the silent arbitration agreement did
not authorize class actions and therefore the parties' intentions could not be inter-
preted otherwise.' 58
The Supreme Court's decision contravenes public policy and legislative histo-
ry, both under the FAA and under other statutory rights. AnimalFeeds provides
animal food components such as fish oil to animal food producers around the
world.s9 It contracts with shippers to send its products to the producers.6 o Inter-
national shipping generally is controlled by use of "charter parties" or pre-written
form, highly standardized, contracts, chosen by the sender.'61 The one at issue in
Stolt-Nielsen had been in use since 1950.162
In 2003, a Justice Department criminal investigation determined that Stolt-
Nielsen, the shipper in this case, had engaged in illegal price-fixing activities. 163
That indictment was dismissed by the district court and the Justice Department did
not appeal.' Several shippers filed lawsuits, which were consolidated and sent to
arbitration.165  AnimalFeeds then filed a demand for class arbitration in New
York.166 The parties chose a panel of arbitrators to determine whether class arbi-
tration was appropriate, stipulating that the arbitration agreement was silent as to
class actions.167 When the arbitrators certified a class action, Stolt-Nielsen ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court held that the silent arbitration clause could not be
read to allow class actions.'68
The result: each plaintiff can bring an individual action for small damages.
The reality: few, if any, affected companies will fund such actions. Even if the
statute allows for attorneys' fees, the damages are too small to warrant the time
and expense of investigating and pursuing the claim. The effect: consumers pay
more because of the excessive costs charged, large corporations get away with
antitrust violations, and the public at large remains unaware of the problem. In
other words, because of the Supreme Court ruling, big business controls the me-
thods, the costs, and the outcomes.
Here the Court relied on its longstanding approach of looking to the intent of
the parties as set out in the contract. 169 But in this case there was no intent to al-
158. Id. at 1776.
159. Id. at 1764.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
163. Id.
164. Justice Department Will Not Appeal Stolt-Nielson Decision, Justice Department Press Release,
(Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/228788.htm.
165. See, e.g., In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 n.1
(J.P.M.L. 2003) (consolidation; JLM Industries, Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 387 F.3d 163, 183 (2004)
(sent to arbitration)).
166. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765.
167. Id. at 1766.
168. Id. at 1776. Likely there will be many articles written about the death of class action arbitrations
following Stolt-Nielsen. This article merely acknowledges the effect as part of how contracting parties,
courts, and Congress must consider arbitration going forward. The Court has moved from hostility to
being too permissive to the current approach that favors large businesses. Hopefully Congress and the
courts soon will move toward a middle ground where parties negotiating at arms' length can agree to
hire arbitrators to decide specific claims, as the FAA and its supporters intended.
169. Id. at 1770.
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low class arbitrations evidenced because there had not been a history of class ac-
tions in international shipping and the charter party was written before the federal
rule allowing class actions existed.o7 0 The Court held that, without intent, a class
action was not authorized.'7 1 The Court was very careful to say that it did not rule
out the possibility of class actions where the contract does not specify them if,
from the agreement, the intent can be found.172 But what the Supreme Court
created, without saying so, is a requirement of an affirmative showing of intent to
allow class actions. The Court did not address whether courts can apply state law
or public policy to hold class action waivers unconscionable. It appears clear that
arbitrators cannot apply policy. The Court will take up the issue of state uncons-
cionability claims in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, discussed below.
One aside in Stolt-Nielsen, that Justice Ginsburg latched onto in dissent, is
Justice Alito's observation that "the parties [here] are sophisticated business enti-
ties," and "that it is customary for the shipper to choose the charter party that is
used for a particular shipment."'73 Justice Ginsburg in dissent noted, "the Court
apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization requirement contracts of ad-
hesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." 74 Neither Justice Alito in his
majority opinion nor Justice Ginsburg in her dissent distinguished between sophis-
tication and bargaining power. Nor did either provide any guidance as to how the
Court might answer the issue of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion pre-
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. And Justice Ginsburg ignored the fact that
courts long have required more than a contract of adhesion presented on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis to void an arbitration clause.17 5
In its first decision post-Stolt-Nielsen, though, the Court did not reinforce Jus-
tice Ginsburg's hopeful reading of Justice Alito's opinion. In In re American
Express Merchants' Litigation,176 the Second Circuit refused to enforce a class
action waiver in an antitrust claim between small merchants (less than $10 million
annually in American Express charges) and American Express where the cost of
bringing an individual action effectively would prohibit it. The claim centered on
fees charged by American Express for credit cards that were higher than fees
charged by comparable credit card companies. In order to accept American Ex-
press' charge cards, which were profitable for the merchants, American Express'
standard contract required them to also accept the credit cards, and to pay the
same higher fees that they paid for the charge cards. The standard contract also
contained a provision that waived both class and collective actions and required
the merchants to try all claims in arbitration.
In that case, the claimants demonstrated that the fees for experts necessary to
prove the violation and the small damages per merchant would prohibit bringing
individual actions. The Second Circuit reasoned that the waiver "violate[d] the
firm principle of antitrust law to the effect that an agreement which in practice
acts as a waiver of future liability under the federal antitrust statutes is void as a
170. Id. at 1769 n.6.
171. Id. at 1776.
172. Id. at 1776 n.10.
173. Id. at 1775 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Gingsburg, J., dissenting)).
174. Id. at 1783.
175. See, e.g., Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690-91.
176. 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010).
No. 2] 263
29
Doneff: Doneff: Arbitration Clauses in Contracts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
matter of public policy."1 77 The Second Circuit looked at the many cases that
refused to enforce class action waivers in consumer contracts based on unconscio-
nability and specifically rejected the unconscionability theory in favor of the ar-
gument that public policy mandated a forum to protect statutory rights. Because
the class action waiver effectively prevented them from protecting their rights, the
Second Circuit held, it was not enforceable.178
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Second Circuit's decision with-
out opinion and remanded it in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen."'9 The Su-
preme Court's lack of guidance to the Second Circuit is puzzling. It appears the
Court simply invalidated all case law for the past twenty or more years finding
class action waivers invalid as well as those allowing class actions where the arbi-
tration clauses were silent. If so, the Supreme Court has treated all powerless
parties equally-leaving all the power in the hands of the companies that draft
arbitration clauses and proffer them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Justice Gins-
burg did not dissent or challenge the decision. Her desire to protect the less so-
phisticated party or the one with unequal bargaining power was not raised in this
decision. Perhaps the distinction she seeks is between consumer and commercial
arbitration rather than bargaining power.
Just as in the many cases in which the California courts have refused to en-
force class action waivers by consumers, discussed below, the losers in the Ameri-
can Express litigation are likely the consumers-merchants will simply pass along
to customers the costs associated with complying with the contract. And in cases
like Stolt-Nielsen, if no one brings the antitrust claims, the large companies learn
that they can get away with their actions, so long as they continue to have arbitra-
tion agreements. The consumers pay the higher prices, not the large companies
and ultimately not the shipping companies. In each case, requiring arbitration
ensures that the consumer's rights go unprotected. By enforcing arbitration provi-
sions for claims that can only be brought as class actions, then requiring authoriza-
tion of class or even collective actions in arbitration, the Supreme Court has
stepped further from the original intent of the FAA.
The merchants' sophistication in the American Express litigation provided
them no power to negotiate with American Express when it required them to ac-
cept a less desirable credit card if they wanted to accept the elite card or required
them to sign a standard form contract that waived all rights to bring a class action.
In effect, the Supreme Court's decision handed American Express even more
power, because the decision in essence held that it is okay for American Express
to hide its alleged antitrust activities behind arbitration.
2. The Supreme Court Will Decide Whether to Allow Courts to Invalidate
Class Action Waivers Based on Varying State Law Interpretations of Un-
conscionability
Over time, courts around the country have ruled differently on whether class
action waivers should be enforced in consumer and employment cases. In Laster
177. Id. at 319.
178. Id. at 320.
179. Am. Exp. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (mem.).
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v. AT&T Mobility LLC,180 to be heard in the Supreme Court's 2010/2011 term, as
AT&T v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit once again found a class action waiver
unconscionable and refused to enforce it. The Ninth Circuit followed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Discover Bank v. Super. Ct. of L.A.,' and held
that exculpatory clauses in arbitration contracts are substantively unconsciona-
ble.182 In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court looked to California's
Civil Code, which states that all contracts that attempt to exempt anyone from
responsibility for his own fraud or willful injury to another are not enforceable as
a matter of public policy.183 It held that not all class action waivers are unenforce-
able, but
when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting
in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by Califor-
nia law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party "from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or prop-
erty of another." (Civ.Code, § 1668.) Under these circumstances, such
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be en-
forced. 184
This holding explained twenty years of California courts either invalidating
arbitration clauses that waived class actions or allowing class actions in arbitra-
tion, despite class action waivers or silent arbitration clauses.'8 5
The Supreme Court will hear the appeal of this decision in the 2010/2011
term, and either uphold states' rights to apply their own law in making decisions
on whether it is unconscionable to require a party to an arbitration agreement to
waive its right to class actions or decide in line with Stolt-Nielsen that it is the
contract that matters. The Court must determine whether the intent of the contract
was to authorize a class action. If the contract does not authorize class actions,
according to Stolt-Nielsen, the parties have no right to a class action.
The Court could find that the facts of Laster argue even more strongly than
Stolt-Nielsen in favor of strict contract interpretation. In Stolt-Nielsen, the con-
tract was silent. Here it is specific. Obviously a contract that specifically waives
the right to a class action does not authorize class actions. The Court has already
held that contracts of adhesion are enforceable unless they are unconscionable.
The other ground for invalidating contracts of adhesion is that they do not allow
180. 584 F.3d 849, (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct.
3322 (2010).
181. 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005).
182. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857.
183. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108.
184. Id. at 1110.
185. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100, and cases discussed therein. But see Puleo v. Chase Bank
USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (decided after Stolt, and upholding a District Court decision
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parties to pursue their statutory rights. But in In re American Express Litigation
the Supreme Court apparently upheld a class action waiver by corporations where
the court found enforcing it would not allow parties to pursue statutorily protected
rights. One way to affirm the Ninth Circuit decision without running into the
American Express decision is for the Supreme Court to rely on the sophisti-
cated/unsophisticated distinction to uphold the unconscionability decision. It
would have to find that a state may decide that a contract of adhesion, presented
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to a party with less business savvy, and/or grossly
unequal bargaining power, which waives statutory rights that Congress intended
to protect, is unconscionable.
Although perhaps legally and ethically correct, and far more in line with the
intended purpose of the FAA, such a decision would fly in the face of the Court's
recent emphasis on contract language. It might also create more litigation by
businesses that would (correctly) argue that they, too, should be able to avoid
arbitration or have the courts modify their arbitration agreements at least to allow
class actions in order to protect their rights.
If the Court upholds the California decision, the simplest way for it to justify
its holding would be to say that states have the right to determine unconscionabili-
ty standards. Such a decision, of course, would leave us with extreme conflicts
between states, no guidance, and increasing litigation in state courts. For the vast
majority of businesses that today operate nationally or even internationally, the
inconsistency needs to be corrected. The Supreme Court should use the opportu-
nity to provide specific guidance and to provide protections from over-reaching
corporations.
California has been the most vocal opponent of class action waivers in arbi-
tration. Other courts have also held that class action waivers are not enforceable
in arbitration based on the public policy that statutory rights must have a forum.
But most courts have upheld class action waivers. 18 6 One distinction courts ap-
pear to make is whether the statute the individual seeks to enforce provides attor-
neys' fees to a prevailing party; in other words, whether parties are likely to find
someone to bring the case for them.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit has upheld class action waivers,' but in
one case refused to uphold the waiver because the statute under which the indi-
vidual sued did not provide for attorneys' fees.'88 Interestingly, applying the Ele-
venth Circuit decision shortly thereafter, the district court for the Northern District
of Georgia upheld a class action waiver for essentially the same claim against the
same party, Comcast. The distinction-the choice of statute under which the par-
ties chose to sue: the Cable Act, which the plaintiff in the Eleventh Circuit case
sued under, does not provide for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, but the
186. See, e.g., Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (where
attorney's fees are recoverable under the statute, a claimant is able to recover fully in arbitration and
class action waiver is unenforceable). For a thorough overview of cases upholding versus invalidating
class action waivers, see Bryon Allyn Rice, Comment, Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HoUs. L. REv. 215 (2008), and specifically cases
discussed at 45 HoUS. L. REv. 226 n.68.
187. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2005).
188. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Jenkins and refus-
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Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, under which the second plaintiff sued,
does. 8 The district court case appears not to have been appealed, but makes it
clear that the court intended to limit the exception to only cases in which attor-
neys' fees could not be recovered.
These cases provide one more example of the burden created on both courts
and parties by leaving these decisions to the courts to make in each individual
case. The lack of predictability makes drafting arbitration clauses nearly impossi-
ble and litigation inevitable. The Supreme Court and Congress both have the
opportunity to end this problem. Of course, if the Supreme Court chooses to end
the problem by simply enforcing the contracts, parties will have predictability but
no avenue for redress.
3. The Supreme Court Also Reads the Contract Strictly in Other Types of
Claims
In Rent-a-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,190 also decided in the 2009/2010 term,
the Supreme Court, with the same 5-4 majority (Scalia drafting, Alito, Thomas,
Roberts, and Kennedy joining) as Stolt-Nielsen, sent the issue of whether an arbi-
tration clause was unconscionable to the arbitrator because the parties' contract
"clearly and unmistakably" referred issues of enforceability to the arbitrator. The
Court reasoned that Jackson challenged the entire arbitration agreement rather
than the delegation clause (the part of the arbitration agreement that states the
arbitrator will decide the issues), so his challenge was to the validity of the con-
tract as a whole, a question for the arbitrator.191
Justice Stevens' strong dissent, joined by the other three justices, pointed out
that the agreement at issue was an arbitration agreement; it just happened to be a
separate contract rather than part of Jackson's employment contract. Thus, Ste-
vens argued, a challenge to the arbitration agreement fell under the first category
of challenges-challenges only to the validity of the arbitration clause-not the
second-challenges to the entire contract.1 92
This decision only peripherally addressed sophistication or unequal bargain-
ing power, as Justice Stevens asserted that Jackson's argument, that the arbitration
agreement was unconscionable, raised the issue of whether the agreement "clearly
and unmistakably" evinced the parties' intent to submit questions of arbitrability
to the arbitrator; which must have been answered in the negative.' 93 Instead, Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that the validity of the arbitration clause must have been
decided separately from the validity of the other claims-in this case employment
discrimination-which would have made it a question for the court. Stevens
quoted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 208, Comment d (1979)
for the proposition that "'gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may ... show that the weaker
189. Honig v. Comcast Corp., 537 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1287 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
190. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
191. Id. at 2778-79 (asserting that it was following Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04 & Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).
192. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2784.
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party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or
appear to assent to the unfair terms."'l
94
In other words, if the contract is unconscionable, a court can determine that
the party did not in fact agree to the terms of the contract. In Jackson, if the Court
were to find that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, then Jackson
would still be able to pursue his discrimination claims, not in arbitration, but in
court. Justice Stevens' argument was consistent with the FAA-letting people
who want to arbitrate pursue arbitration, while not forcing those who do not want
to arbitrate to give up their rights to judicial determination. It would also be con-
sistent with Justice Alito's reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen-the parties must authorize
the arbitrator to decide. When presented with an unconscionable agreement, an
issue is raised as to whether the parties intended to agree to it or agreed because
they had no real choice. Unfortunately, the Court chose the path that leaves the
more powerful corporation with the stronger position-the corporation can now
argue to the arbitrator, who is often paid by the corporation, that the arbitrator
should hear a claim he or she will be paid to hear.
V. CONGRESS AND THE COURTS MUST PROVIDE GUIDANCE So THAT
ARBITRATION CAN CONTINUE To ACHIEVE ITS GOALS AND THAT
PROTECTED RIGHTS REMAIN PROTECTED
Parties voluntarily choose arbitration to create a fair, quick, affordable means
for resolving disputes. Unfortunately, some powerful companies have used a
good process to create one-sided protections for themselves. The Supreme
Court's decisions during the 2009/2010 term not only allow these companies to
get away with potentially illegal or unethical behavior, they encourage it.
A blanket rule that parties with less bargaining power, or who are significant-
ly less sophisticated than the drafting party, should be able to get out of their con-
tracts, disregards most state contract law and simply does not solve the problem of
how to return arbitration to its negotiated, quick, and efficient start.
One option, of course, is for parties to start refusing to sign pre-dispute claus-
es or to be more deliberate in drafting them. Rather than blanket clauses that in-
clude all potential claims and exclude class actions, parties can and should consid-
er taking the time to draft a well thought out clause.'9 ' Parties should address
class actions, whether to arbitrate or to litigate statutorily protected rights, and
should choose different approaches for different types of disputes (e.g. mediation
for disputes within an ongoing relationship, litigation for issues of precedential
value, and arbitration for commercial business disputes). Of course, this proposal
requires that all parties have sufficient bargaining power to effect change, a scena-
rio that seems unlikely even in many business-to-business negotiations.
Because most parties who sign pre-dispute clauses have insufficient bargain-
ing power to protect their rights, specific protections need to be built into the law.
194. Id.
195. See Stipanowich, supra note 151, at 50-59; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Symposium Key-
note Presentation, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the "New Litigation ", 7 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L. J. 383, 387 (2009) (discussing a proposed business protocol for arbitration because lawyers
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The FAA needs to be modified to clarify that class actions are allowed, regardless
of whether arbitration clauses allow them or are silent. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure can be revised to state that courts have sole jurisdiction over determin-
ing whether claims should be pursued as class actions. If a court certifies a class,
the whole claim should be sent to court for adjudication, unless the parties then
agree to hold the entire action in arbitration. Both parties would have to agree to
arbitration. That way, claims are not tried in a piecemeal fashion, another prob-
lem that is created when only some claims are sent to arbitration.
Claims that really need to be determined by juries and heard by courts-
discrimination, civil rights, antitrust cases that could create important precedent-
should not go to arbitration. Blanket arbitration clauses must be re-examined
post-dispute to ensure that the rights of all parties, and society's concerns, can be
met in arbitration. It is an issue that should be decided by a court up front rather
than on appeal.
Companies should not be able to hide their wrongdoings by forcing claims
against them into arbitration. And courts, especially the United States Supreme
Court, should not continue to let them. Arbitration hearings should be open to the
public unless all parties agree or the arbitrator orders that they be private. Deci-
sions should be published, as the AAA has started publishing its employment
decisions. Although the decisions will not provide binding precedent, they can
create guidance for future decisions, arbitration awards, and perhaps even courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to revise the FAA. The United States is no longer a nation where
businesses sue only similarly situated businesses. It is no longer a nation where
most claims affect only one party. Many of our actions have national and even
global effects. Congress must consider that the concerns it expressed back in
1924 and 1925 of businesses requiring arbitration on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
have come to pass. Arbitration is being required in take-it-or-leave-it contracts by
companies with disproportionate bargaining power against other companies with
significantly less bargaining power, as well as against individuals with little or no
bargaining power. In each instance, society suffers. Important protections pro-
vided by Congress cannot be pursued. Arbitration has become too expensive and
too limiting. Congress and the courts must re-examine arbitration and make sure
it returns to its intended use-arms-length negotiated agreements designed to
allow quick, efficient, and effective resolution of claims, not contracts of adhesion
that make it difficult or impossible for parties to protect themselves or pursue their
claims.
196. See generally David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validi-
ty, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49 (2003); see also Kathleen M. Scan-
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